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Abstract—Smart meters enable improvements in electricity
distribution system efficiency at some cost in customer privacy.
Users with home batteries can mitigate this privacy loss by
applying charging policies that mask their underlying energy
use. A battery charging policy is proposed and shown to
provide universal privacy guarantees subject to a constraint
on energy cost. The guarantee bounds our strategy’s maximal
information leakage from the user to the utility provider under
general stochastic models of user energy consumption. The
policy construction adapts coding strategies for non-probabilistic
permuting channels to this privacy problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart meters (SMs) provide advanced monitoring of con-
sumer energy usage, thereby enabling optimized management
and control of electricity distribution systems [1]. Unfortu-
nately, the data collected by SMs can reveal information about
consumers’ activities. For instance, an individual’s energy
usage pattern may leak information about the times at which
they run individual appliances [2]. Two approaches have
been proposed to tackle the privacy threat posed by such
information leakage. One strategy involves manipulating user
data before sending it to the utility provider (UP) [3]; this
approach improves privacy at the cost of reduced operational
insight for the UP. The other strategy employs rechargeable
batteries at each consumer site to try to decouple energy
usage from energy requests [4]; allowing devices to run off
of either the battery or the UP and allowing the battery to
charge at times of both activity and inactivity improves privacy
at the cost of introducing individual batteries and, potentially,
increasing consumer costs (e.g., if energy is requested when
it best conceals the consumers’ usage without regard to the
energy bill). This paper investigates the latter approach.
Understanding the privacy implications of any strategy
requires an appropriate privacy metric. A variety of metrics
are used to study privacy in energy distribution systems.
These include statistical distance metrics [4], differential pri-
vacy [5], distortion metrics [6], and information metrics like
mutual information, which can be applied under a variety
of assumptions on users’ energy, including i.i.d. [7], [4],
[8], [9], [10], stationary [11], [12], and first-order time-
homogeneous Markov random processes [13]; see [14] for
a comprehensive review. Alternative privacy metrics such as
maximal leakage [15] have operational descriptions and relate
to information measures like Sibson mutual information; its
generalization, maximal α-leakage [16], establishes additional
relationships to Arimoto mutual information, mutual informa-
tion, and Renyi entropy [15], [16]. Many of these measures
can be understood as measures of an adversary’s ability to gain
insight into an unknown random variable X by observing Y ,
with measures differing only in the loss functions they use to
quantify that insight [16].
We here use mutual information to measure privacy both be-
cause its interpretation in terms of an adversary that minimizes
log-loss with respect to an evolving soft-decision model [16]
is well-matched to the evolving nature of energy distribution
over time and because mutual information provides a useful
bridge to adjacent fields such as hypothesis testing [17],
estimation [18], and learning [19].
Since user energy consumption may be non-stationary, we
seek privacy guarantees that apply across general random pro-
cess models of energy consumption. Moreover, given that no
battery can store unlimited energy, we impose finite capacity
bounds on batteries. We therefore model the energy manage-
ment unit (EMU) as a deterministic finite-state channel. We
then adapt the Ahlswede-Kaspi coding strategy proposed for
permuting channels [20] to the SM privacy setting. This work
generalizes the battery policy proposed in [21] by including
the price of the energy requested from the grid and minimizing
information leakage subject to a bound on the resulting energy
bill.
We denote vectors by bold letters, e.g. x, and random
variables by uppercase letters, e.g. X . The operator σ(·)
denotes the sum over vector elements, e.g. σ(x) =
∑
i xi.
Intervals on the integers are denoted by double brackets, e.g.Ja, bK = {a, a+ 1, . . . , b−1, b}. The n-fold cartersian product
of the interval is denoted by Ja, bKn = Ja, bK × . . . × Ja, bK.
Given a vector x of size n and a set of indices A ⊆ J1, nK, we
denote by xA the vector xA = {xi : i ∈ A}. The support of
the probability distribution PX is denoted by supp(PX), and
the positive part operator is (a)+ = max(0, a).
II. ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WITH A FINITE
BATTERY MODEL
Figure 1 depicts an energy management system and the
random processes therein. The privacy guarantee is defined in
terms of the information leakage from the user to the provider,
and the task of the EMU is to choose a battery policy that
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2Fig. 1. Energy Management System with Finite Battery Model
minimizes the leakage while satisfying the operation and cost
constraints. Formal definitions follow.
We model user energy consumption as a discrete-time
random process Xn on alphabet Xn = J0, αKn. The random
variable Xi describes the energy consumed by the user at time
step i with i = 0, 1, ..., n − 1. For exposition simplicity we
assume X ⊆ Z; the results generalize to arbitrary discrete
alphabets. We use PXn ∈ PXn to denote the energy consump-
tion pattern distribution, where PXn is a fixed family of such
distributions. Since user energy consumption profiles tend to
exhibit non-stationarities [4], PXn may contain non-stationary
random processes.
The EMU maps consumption sequence Xn ∈ Xn to a
request sequence Y n ∈ Yn using a battery policy PY n|Xn
that is not allowed to vary with Xn; random variable Yi
describes the energy requested from the UP at time step
i = 0, 1, ..., n−1. We again focus on integer random variables
(Y ⊆ Z) for simplicity. We require Y ⊇ X so that the UP can
satisfy the user’s energy consumption even when no battery
is available. We allow Y to contain negative values to model
scenarios where users can sell energy back to the grid.
To be considered feasible, battery policy PY n|Xn must
create a request sequence that meets the energy demands of
the user and does not request energy it cannot use or store. Let
β denote the finite capacity of a given battery (in energy units)
and Si denote the amount of energy stored in that battery, the
“energy state,” at time i. Then Si takes values in S = J0, βK
and is governed by the charging dynamics
Si = s0 +
i−1∑
k=0
Yk −
i−1∑
k=0
Xk, (1)
where s0 ∈ S is the initial battery state. A power outage
occurs when Si + Yi −Xi < 0; energy is wasted when
Si + Yi −Xi > β. Under this model, the battery resembles a
box, energy units resemble balls that can be inserted (stored)
and removed (consumed), and the set Yn(s0,x) of feasible
requests, defined formally below, contains all sequences of
insertions and removals allowed by the box. This feasibility
constraint resembles [20][Eq. 2.4] from the work of Ahlswede
and Kaspi; this link is studied in [21].
Definition 1: Given a battery with initial state s0 ∈ S
and capacity β, the set of feasible energy requests for energy
consumption sequence x ∈ Xn is
Yn(s0,x) ∆= {y ∈ Yn : si ∈ J0, βK ∀ i ∈ J0, nK}. (2)
The set of feasible battery policies is
Ω(s0)
∆
={PY n|Xn:supp(PY n|Xn=x)⊆Yn(s0,x) ∀ x∈Xn}. (3)
Our aim in feasible policy design is to minimize privacy
subject to a constraint on policy cost. Towards this end,
we next define our measures of information leakage (where
privacy is high when information leakage is low) and cost.
We measure a battery policy’s information leakage by its
worst-case performance.
Definition 2: The information leakage of policy PY n|Xn is
I¯(PY n|Xn) = max
PXn∈PXn
1
n
I(Xn;Y n). (4)
We measure the cost of a policy PY n|Xn as the difference
between the user’s energy bill under that policy and the user’s
energy bill under the feasible battery policy that minimizes the
energy bill. (Under this definition, cost can be negative only
for infeasible policies.) To calculate energy bills, we model
the energy market price as a deterministic sequence, m ∈ Rn.
Under this definition, the cost of an energy request sequence
y is mTy. We assume that the market price is constant over
each of K blocks of time. The price and duration of the k-th
block, k = 0, 1, . . . ,K−1, are mk and lk, respectively, giving
m = (m0, . . . ,m0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l0
,m1, . . . ,m1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l1
, . . . ,mK−1, . . . ,mK−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
lK−1
). (5)
Definition 3: Consider an EMU with battery capacity β,
initial state s0 ∈ S , and market price m. The system cost of
energy consumption sequence x ∈ Xn under battery policy
PY n|Xn is
g(Y n,x) = EPY n|Xn=x [m
TY n −mTy∗(x)], (6)
where y∗(x) = argminy∈Yn(s0,x) m
Ty. For any ∆ ≥ 0, the
set of feasible ∆-affordable battery policies is
Γ(∆)
∆
=
{
PY n|Xn ∈ Ω(s0) : g(Y n,x) ≤ ∆ ∀ x ∈ Xn
}
. (7)
Finally, the privacy-cost function defines the optimal trade-
off between privacy and cost achievable by feasible battery
policies.
Definition 4: Given an EMU with battery capacity β, initial
state s0 and market price m, the privacy cost function is
defined, for each ∆ ≥ 0, as
I(∆) ∆= min
PY n|Xn∈Γ(∆)
I¯(PY n|Xn). (8)
To bound I(∆), we adapt techniques developed by
Ahlswede and Kaspi [20] from channel capacity to privacy-
cost. While the resulting solution employs a non-causal battery
policy, detailed analysis of [20] shows that knowing just β+1
time steps ahead suffices to achieve optimality, where β is the
3battery capacity. Thus, we envision practical implementations
that rely on consumption predictions. This approach also
provides insight on what prediction capabilities are needed.
III. GEOMETRY OF THE FEASIBLE SETS
A. Shared Output Sequences
Lemma 1 characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition
under which a set A of input pairs (s0,x) share a common
feasible output sequence yA. Such shared output sequences are
good for privacy since a UP that sees yA cannot distinguish
which input pair (s0,x) ∈ A caused it. Conversly, when two
inputs (s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ) share no feasible output yA, the EMU
cannot hide from the UP which pair caused the request. The
following measure of distance is useful for that analysis.
Definition 5: The distance between two input pairs
(s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ) ∈ S × Xn is defined as
dn
(
(s0,x),(sˆ0,xˆ)
)
= max
i∈J0,n−1K
∣∣∣(s0−σ(xi))−(sˆ0−σ(xˆi))∣∣∣. (9)
Lemma 1 shows that the distance between input pairs
determines the existence of a shared feasible output y. The
result emphasizes the central role that battery capacity β plays
in privacy.
Lemma 1: Let A denote a subset of the input pair alphabet
S × Xn. The following two statements are equivalent.
a) The distance between every two pairs (s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ) ∈ A
is less than or equal to the capacity of the battery, i.e.
dn
(
(s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ)
)
≤ β for all (s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ) ∈ A. (10)
b) All sequences in A share a feasible request yA, i.e.
yA ∈
⋂
(s0,x)∈A
Yn(s0,x). (11)
Proof: Let the sequence yA be such that for all i:
σ(yiA) = − min
(s0,x)∈A
(s0 − σ(xi)). (12)
Thus, for any (sˆ0, xˆ) ∈ A, the battery state at time i+ 1 is
si+1 = (sˆ0−σ(xˆi))− min
(s0,x)∈A
(s0−σ(xi)). (13)
Now dn
(
(s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ)
) ≤ β implies that si+1 ∈ J0, βK for
all i, so yA is a feasible sequence. The converse follows since
for any sequence y and any two input pairs (s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ) ∈
A such that dn
(
(s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ)
)
> β, the absolute difference
between the corresponding battery states at some time step i
satisfies∣∣si+1 − sˆi+1∣∣ = ∣∣(s0 − σ(xi))− (sˆ0 − σ(xˆi))∣∣ > β. (14)
Thus si+1 and sˆi+1 cannot both belong to S = J0, βK. 
B. Cardinality bounds
Building on Lemma 1, Theorem 1 gives an upper bound on
the number of distinguishable input pairs (s0,xn) ∈ S0×Xn,
where S0 ⊆ S is the set of possible initial battery states. The
result is derived by building a covering {Ai} of S0×X such
that all input pairs in each Ai share a common feasible request
yi. The result shows that the minimal time λ
∆
= b(β + 1)/αc
needed to fully discharge a battery of capacity β under max-
imal consumption α ∆= maxX is a central parameter in the
construction of privacy preserving battery policies. The proof
is inspired by the code construction presented by Ahlswede
and Kaspi [20, Proposition 1].
Theorem 1: Let the input alphabet be S0 × Xn, with S0
and S0 denoting the maximum and minimum values of S0,
respectively. There exists a set of request sequences Vn(S0) ⊆
Yn such that
log
∣∣Vn(S0)∣∣ ≤ ⌈n− ⌊(β + S0 − S0)/α⌋
λ
⌉
. (15)
Moreover, for every input pair (s0,x) ∈ S0×Xn, at least one
sequence v ∈ Vn(S0) is feasible, that is
Yn(s0,x) ∩ Vn(S0) 6= ∅. (16)
Proof: At time step i, the value of s0−σ(xi) for any input
pair (s0,x) ∈ S0 ×X i with X = J0, αK is bounded by
S0 − iα ≤ s0 − σ(xi) ≤ S0. (17)
At time step l =
⌊
(β + S0 − S0)/α
⌋
, the distance between
any two input pairs (s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ) ∈ S0 ×X l is bounded by
dl
(
(s0,x), (sˆ0, xˆ)
)
≤ S0 − (S0 − lα) ≤ β. (18)
Therefore, Lemma 1 guarantees the existence of a request y0
that is feasible for every input pair in S0 × X l. Following a
similar reasoning, consider the set of possible input pairs dur-
ing the subsequent λ times steps, i.e. S×X λ with S = J0, βK.
Define a cover of the input alphabet, S × X λ ⊆ (A1
⋃A2),
with subsets given by
A1 =
{
(s0,x) ∈ S × X λ : s0 − σ(x) ∈ J0, βK} , (19)
and
A2 =
{
(s0,x) ∈ S × X λ : s0 − σ(x) ∈ J−λα,−1K} . (20)
NoteA1
⋃A2 contains all sequences in S×X λ as (17) implies
that s0 − σ(x) ∈ J−λα, βK. The distance between any two
input pairs in Ai with i = 1, 2 is bounded by β. Therefore,
by Lemma 1, there exists a shared feasible sequence yi for
all pairs in Ai. Setting κ = d(n− l)/λe and
Vn(S0)={y0}×{y1,y2} × ...× {y1,y2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ
(21)
completes the proof. 
To map input pairs (s0,x) to energy request in Vn(S0) it
suffices to forecast, at the start of each block of length λ,
whether the battery will deplete during the current block, i.e.
4s0 − σ(xλ) ≶ 0. In [22], it is shown that the upper bound
in Theorem 1 is tight. The construction of the set of request
sequences given by (21) describes the forecasting capabilities
required to implement optimal battery policies.
Theorem 2: Let s0 denote the state of the battery at time
0, and let Sl denote the possible states of the battery at time
l ∈ J0, nK. Then there exists a set W l({s0},Sl) ⊆ X l with
cardinality ∣∣W l({s0},Sl)∣∣ ≥ 2κˆ ⌈ lα− κˆ dλeα|Sl|
⌉
, (22)
and
Y l(s0,w,Sl) ∩ Y l(s′0,w′,Sl) = ∅, (23)
for any distinct (s0,w), (sˆ0, wˆ) inW l(S0,Sl), λ = (β+1)/α
and κˆ = max(0, bl/ dλe − 1c).
Proof: We prove the result by constructing a set of
sequences that satisfies the conditions of the theorem. The
construction is done by concatenation of κˆ blocks of length
dλe and one block of length l − κˆ dλe, i.e.
W l({s0},Sl) =Wdλe × ...×Wdλe︸ ︷︷ ︸
κˆ
×W l−κˆdλeSl . (24)
Let the alphabet defining the first κˆ blocks be Wdλe =
{w′,w′′}, where w′ and w′′ are any sequences in X dλe such
that σ(w′) = 0 and σ(w′′) = dλeα. This implies that
d
(
(s0,w
′), (s0,w′′)
)
= |σ(w′′)− σ(w′)| = dλeα > β. (25)
Therefore, by Lemma 1, no output sequence is shared between
the input pairs (s0,w′) and (s0,w′′), i.e
Ydλe(s0,w′) ∩ Ydλe(s0,w′′) = ∅. (26)
Thus, the input sequence wy ∈ {w′,w′′}, and the initial
battery state of the second block sdλe = s0−σ(wy)+σ(y) are
uniquely determined by the output sequence y. The argument
above can be applied recursively for the first κˆ blocks.
Following a similar reasoning, let the alphabet defining the
last block be given by W l−κˆdλe = {w0,w1, ...,wN} with
N = b(lα− κˆ dλeα)/|Sl|c and wi any sequence in X l−κˆdλe
such that σ(wi) = i|Sl|. Consequently, for any given y, only
one sequence wj satisfies the constraint sl = sκˆdλe−σ(wj)+
σ(y) ∈ Sl simultaneously. This completes the proof. 
C. Impact of the Output Alphabet on Information Leakage
In the following, we characterize the impact of the output
alphabet on the information leakage I(∆). In particular, we
show that the information leakage does not increase when the
policy operates with a constrained output alphabet Yc. Lemma
2 shows that it is possible to remove extreme values, i.e. yi 6∈J0, αK, while retaining the feasibility of the sequence y ∈
Y(s0,x).
Lemma 2: Let two output alphabets Ync and Yn be such
that J0, αKn ⊆ Ync ⊆ Yn ⊆ Zn. Then there exists a function
Fn : Yn → Ync such that for any (s0,x) ∈ S × Xn and
y ∈ Yn(s0,x) it holds that
Fn(y) ∈ Ync (s0,x). (27)
Proof: We first define the set of functions {hi}ni=1 that will
yield the construction of Fn. For each function hi with i ∈J1, nK set di ∈ J0, (yi − α)+K and define hi : Yn → Ync as
hi(y)=
{
y + di(ei+1 − ei), when i ∈ J1, n− 1K
y − diei, otherwise.
(28)
That is, the function hi reallocates the purchase of di units
of energy from time step i to the next time step i + 1. Note
that when this occurs on the last time step, i.e. when i = n,
the excess energy request is not reallocated but removed from
the sequence. Let s ∈ Sn+1 be the sequence of battery states
induced by the feasible sequence y. By the battery charging
dynamics (1), the sequence of battery states induced by y˜ =
hi(y) is given by
s˜ = s− diei+1, (29)
with di ∈ J0, (yi − α)+K. Note that
s˜i+1 = si+1 − di ≤ si+1, (30)
and since xi ≤ α ≤ yi − di
s˜i+1 = s˜i + (yi − di)− xi ≥ si. (31)
As s ∈ Sn+1, this implies that s˜ ∈ Sn+1, i.e. hi(y) is feasible.
The above argument shows that any excess energy request can
be reallocated to the next time step. A similar argument shows
that any excess, i.e. yi ≥ α, can be reallocated to the previous
time step. Furthermore any excess energy selling, i.e. yi < 0,
can be reallocated to the next and previous time steps without
impacting the feasibility of the energy request. A recursive
application of the arguments above yields the existence of the
function Fn constructed as
Fn(y) = hn ◦ hn−1 · · · ◦ h1(y), (32)
so that Fn(y) ∈ Yc(s0,x). 
The lemma above shows that battery policies that operate
over an output alphabet with a maximum energy request that
matches the peak energy consumption of the user, i.e. Y =J0, αK, are sufficient to satisfy the feasibility.
Lemma 3: Let the output alphabet Y contain the input
interval X = J0, αK, then
IX (∞) = IY(∞). (33)
Proof: Lemma 2 states the existence of a function Fn : Yn →
Ync such that if PY n|Xn ∈ Γ(∞) then Fn ◦ PY n|Xn ∈ Γ∞).
The function Fn induces the Markov chain
Xn → Y n → F (Y n). (34)
Therefore I(Xn;Fn(Y n)) ≤ I(Xn;Y n) by the data pro-
cessing inequality. The converse follows by noting that
ΓX (∞) ⊆ ΓY(∞). This completes the proof. 
5However, in general the function Fn does not preserve the
price paid for the energy, as y and Fn(y) may yield different
energy bills. The following lemma identifies the conditions
that guarantee that the energy bill do not change after the
application of Fn.
Lemma 4: Define output alphabet Ync = J−β/l, β/l + αKn
where l = mink lk and lk is the length of the k-th market price
period as defined in (5). Consider a ∆-feasible battery policy
PY n|Xn ∈ Γ(∆). Then there exist a function F̂ : Yn → Ync
such that F ◦ PY n|Xn ∈ Γc(∆).
Proof: Note that the battery charging dynamics (1) deter-
mine the state of the battery at the market transition times
ti+1 = tk + lk with i = 1, . . . , k as
stk+1 = stk − σ(xlk) + σ(ylk), (35)
where stk ∈ J0, βK and σ(xlk) ∈ J0, lkαK. Therefore, when
σ(ylk) ∈ J−β, β+lkαK, the battery state stk+1 takes values onJ0, βK for any value of the previous state stk . This concludes
the proof. 
The lemma above shows that the resulting output sequence
F̂n(y) does not depend on the input pair (s0,x) and instead
depends only on the original output sequence y. This insight
leads to the following result. Lemma 5 shows that the privacy
cost function I(∆) does not vary when the EMU operates with
a constrained output alphabet Yc. This result is consistent with
prior results reported for privacy based on hypothesis testing
[23, Theorem 1] and multi-user scenarios [24, Theorem 2].
Lemma 5: Define output alphabet Ync = J−β/l, β/l + αKn
where l = mink lk and lk is the length of the k-th market
price period as defined in (5). Let I(∆) and Ic(∆) represent
the privacy-cost functions under output alphabets Yn and Ync
for any output alphabet Yn ⊃ Ync . Then
Ic(∆) = I(∆). (36)
Proof: Let Γ(∆) and Γc(∆) denote the set of feasible ∆-
affordable battery policies under output alphabets Yn and Ync .
It follows from [22] that a function F : Yn → Ync exists such
that if PY n|Xn ∈ Γ(∆) then F ◦ PY n|Xn ∈ Γc(∆). Noting
that the function F induces the Markov chain
Xn → Y n → F (Y n) (37)
yields I(Xn;Fn(Y n)) ≤ I(Xn;Y n) by the data pro-
cessing inequality. The converse follows by noting that
Γc(∆) ⊆ Γ(∆). 
We note that the proof for the existence of the function F
presented in [22] requires forecasting of l time steps ahead.
IV. UNIVERSAL PRIVACY BOUNDS
In the following, we bound the information leakage given
in Definition 4. We first study the case for which only the
feasibility constraint is imposed.
Theorem 3: The privacy cost function I(∞) is bounded by
1
n
⌊
n
dλe
⌋
≤ I(∞) ≤ 1
n
⌈
n− bβ/αc
λ
⌉
, (38)
where λ = (β + 1)/α.
Proof: Upper bound. Theorem 1 shows the existence of a
set Vn({s0}) with cardinality bounded by
log|Vn({s0})|≤
⌈
n−b(β+s0−s0)/αc
λ
⌉
=
⌈
n−bβ/αc
λ
⌉
, (39)
such that the intersection Vn({s0}) ∩ Y(s0,x) is not empty
for every input pair (s0,x). Letting the output Y n take values
in Vn({s0}) ∩ Y(s0,x) completes the proof.
Lower bound. Theorem 2 shows that there exists a setWn =
Wn({s0},S) with cardinality bounded by
log |Wn| ≥
⌊
n
dλe
⌋
, (40)
such that no two sequences in Wn share a common output
sequence, i.e. H(Wn|Y n) = 0. Letting Wn take uniformly
distributed values over Wn completes the proof. 
Note that for a sampling period T0 and a maximum power
consumption wˆ = α/T0, the total amount of information
leaked during a time interval T = nT0 is bounded by
nI(∞) ≤
⌊n
λ
⌋
=
⌊
T/T0
(β + 1)/(wˆT0)
⌋
=
⌊
Twˆ
β + 1
⌋
. (41)
Thus the upper bound is independent of the sampling period
T0, i.e. sampling periods under T0 = (β + 1)/wˆ does not
increase the privacy guarantee I(∞). For integer values of λ,
both bounds on Lemma 3 coincide, providing the exact value
of the privacy guarantee nI(∞) = bn/λc. Consequently, the
step behaviour of the privacy guarantee when n increases, is
not an aberration introduced by the tools used in this paper,
but the real behaviour of the system.
Theorem 4 presents our main result, where we bound the
information leakage for arbitrary cost constraints ∆. The proof
proceeds by constructing a battery policy that combines two
components for every request sequence. One of the compo-
nents guarantees the feasibility constraint, while the other
guarantees the cost constraint.
Theorem 4: Consider an EMU with battery capacity β,
initial state s0, market price m, and output alphabet Yn
satisfying Ync ⊆ Yn with Ync defined in Lemma 5, then
I(∆) ≤ I(∞) + IΓ(∆), (42)
where
IΓ(∆) = min
PSˆγ |Sˆω∈Γω(∆)
max
PSˆω∈PSˆω
1
n
I(Sˆγ − Sˆω; Sˆω). (43)
Here Sˆω and Sˆγ are random processes in J0, βKK with joint
distribution determined by
Γω(∆) =
{
PSˆγ |Sˆω : E(Sˆγδ) ≤ ∆− βσ((δ)+)
}
, (44)
where δ ∈ ZK denotes the vector of market price differences,
with entries given by δ0 = −m0, δk = mk−1 −mk for k =
1, 2, . . . ,K − 1 and δK = mK−1.
Proof: We prove the result for Yn = Zn; Lemma 5
generalizes the proof for every Yn satisfying Ync ⊆ Yn. The
6proof follows by dividing the optimization process into two
steps. In the first step, we present a battery policy ω such that
the resulting request sequence V nω satisfies the power outage
and energy waste constraints, i.e., ω ∈ Ω(s0) as defined in
(3). These policies are discussed on Theorem 3. In the second
step, we define a random vector V nγ such that Y
n = V nω +V
n
γ
also satisfies the cost constraints. Specifically, we set
V nγ =
∑
t∈T
(
(et − et+1)(Sγ − Sω)t
)
, (45)
where T denotes the ordered set of time steps at which a
market transition takes place, i.e., T = {0, l0, l0+l1, . . . , n−1}.
This implies that
g(Y n,x)= E[(Sγ)T δ + mTx−mTy∗(x)] (46)
= E[(Sγ)T δ] + βσ((δ)+), (47)
where (46) follows by (45) and the battery charging dynamics
(1) and (47) follow by noting that Yn = Zn. Selecting the
transformation γ determining (Sγ)T from the set described in
(44) yields
I(Xn;Y n) ≤ I(Xn;V nω ) + I(Xn;V nγ |V nω ) (48)
= I(Xn;V nω ) +H(V
n
γ |V nω )−H(V nγ |V nω , Xn, Sω) (49)
= I(Xn;V nω ) +H(Sγ − Sω|V nω )−H(Sγ − Sω|Sω) (50)
≤ I(Xn;V nω ) + I(Sγ − Sω;Sω), (51)
where (49) follows as Xn and V nω determine Sω by the battery
charging dynamics (1); (50) follows by (45) and noting that
Sγ − Sω is independent of V nω and Xn given Sω . Thus
nI(∆) = min
PY n|Xn∈Γ(∆)
max
PXn
I(Xn;Y n) (52)
≤ min
γ∈Γω(∆)
min
ω∈Ω(s0)
max
PXn
(
I(Xn;V nω ) + I(Sγ − Sω;Sω)
)
(53)
≤ min
ω∈Ω(s0)
max
PXn
I(Xn;V nω )+ min
γ∈Γω(∆)
max
PSω
I(Sγ−Sω;Sω). (54)
This completes the proof. 
While direct computation of the information leakage in (8)
relies on finding an n-dimensional joint distribution satisfiying
Γ(∆), the bound presented in (42) relies on a K-dimensional
distribution and the simplified version of Γ(∆) defined in (44).
This significantly eases the computation of the information
leakage as described in Section V. Note also that (43) implies
that IΓ(0) ≤ |Sω| = K/n log2(β+ 1) and IΓ(∆) = 0 for any
∆ ≥ ∆max with ∆max = β‖δ‖1−βm0. Interestingly, a time-
sharing argument presented in [22] yields
I(∆)≤ 1
n
⌈
n−bβ/αc
λ
⌉
+
(
1− ∆
∆max
)+
K
n
log2(β+1). (55)
A. Worst case consumption proccess
Theorem 5: Let the output alphabet Yn satisfy Ync ⊆ Yn
with Ync defined in Lemma 4, then the privacy guarantee I(∆)
as defined by Definition 4, is bounded by
I(∞) + (Il′Γ − γ)+ ≤ I(∆), (56)
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Fig. 2. Upper and lower bounds on the privacy cost function as a function
of the privacy budget.
where l′k = lk − blk/ dλe − 1c+, Il
′
Γ is defined by Definition
?? and γ =
∑
l′k/λ.
Proof: We prove the result by constructing a random
process Wn that achieves the lower bound. Let the input
alphabet Wn ⊆ Xn be divided according to the market price
partitioning, i.e. Wn =W l1 ×W l2 × ...×W lK . Where each
set W lk is divided in two, i.e. W lk =WΩ,k ×W lk−κkλΓ with
WΩ,k = κkλ κk = b(lk + 1/α)/λ− 1c+. Letting the random
processes WnΩ and W
n
Γ take values in WnΩ and WnΓ implies
that
I(Wn;Y n)=
K∑
k=1
I(W lkΩ ;Y
n|W lk)+
K∑
k=1
I(W lkΓ ;Y
n|W lk), (57)
by the chain rule. For the first term, it holds that
I(W lkΩ ;Y
n|W lk)= H(W lkΩ |W lk)−H(W lkΩ |W lk , Y n) (58)
=
⌊
lk
dλe − 1
⌋+
, (59)
since by Theorem 2 it holds that W lkΩ is uniquely determined
by W lk and Y n. For the second term, it holds that
min
PY n|Xn∈Π(Y,∆)
max
PXn∈PXn
K∑
k=0
I(W lkΓ ;Y
n|W lk)= IlkΓ .(60)
This completes the proof. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically assess the upper bounds on
the privacy cost described in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. For
comparison purposes, we also include the lower bounds on the
privacy cost given in [22]. We model the market price after
the UK Economy 7 tariff, where users are charged an off-
peak price of 0.071 £/kWh within a 7 hour block and a peak
price of 0.152 £/kWh otherwise [25]. We assume the user has
an LG Chem RESU 6.5 battery with a capacity of 4.2 kWh
and a peak power of 4.2 kW. For simplicity we match the
7users’ maximum power consumption to the peak power of the
battery, i.e., 4.2 kW [14]. The SM sends the UP integrated
energy readings every 30 min following UK specifications for
SMs [14]. Thus, we set the time elapsed between time steps i
and i+1 to 30 min. Defining 2.1 kWh as 1 unit of energy yields
the following parameters in our system model: battery capacity
β = 4.2 kWh/2.1 kWh = 2; maximum consumption between
time steps α = 4.2 kW× 0.5 h/2.1 kWh = 1; market lengths
l0 = 7 h/0.5 h = 14 and l1 = 17 h/0.5 h = 34; corresponding
market prices of m0 = 0.152 £/ kWh× 2.1 kWh = 0.3192 £
and m1 = 0.071£/ kWh × 2.1 kWh = 0.1791 £ per unit of
energy.
Figure 2 depicts the bounds on the privacy cost I(∆) for
different values of the system cost ∆ and initial battery state
s0 = 0 during a one day period, i.e. n = 24 h/0.5 h =
48. Following (55), when the user does not wish to increase
the system cost for privacy, the privacy cost is bounded by
I(0) = 0.4 bits. For large values of the system cost ∆ the
cost constraint is always satisfied, i.e. IΓ(∆) = 0, and the
privacy leakage is governed by the feasibility constraints.
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